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OBsolete PREVIOUS
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DIST 3 DECEMBER 1976

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2. COMMENT:

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(classification)

ANNOUNCED THE RESIGNATION OF ALVARO PUGA AS DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY GUGO ROSENDE
ALVAREZ, SON OF THE LAWYER WHO HAS RISEN TO PROMINENCE
RECENTLY AS A RESULT OF HIS SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE
GOVERNMENT'S POSITION IN IMPORTANT CASES BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT.)

3.

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(Classification)

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5. [REDACTED] CONTRERAS ALSO LOST A MAJOR
BATTLE TO GUZMAN AND ROSENDE SR. OVER THE DECISION TO RELEASE
ALL THE PRISONERS HELD UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS.

[REDACTED] MAINTAINED THAT CONTRERAS WAS TOTALLY AGAINST THE
POLICY BECAUSE AFTER THE RELEASE, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO
JUSTIFY CONTINUANCE OF THE STATE OF SIEGE. [REDACTED] COMMENTS:

A. IN LATE NOVEMBER, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] CONTRERAS
WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE PRISONER RELEASE, BUT HE FINALLY
ACCEPTED THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION.

B. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT FOLLOWING THE RELEASE
CONTRERAS MAINTAINED THAT CERTAIN CIVILIAN ADVISORS HAD

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OPPOSED THE MEASURE, BUT HE DID NOT INDICATED HIS PERSONAL FEELINGS.

C. IN LATE NOVEMBER, CONTRERAS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AGREED WITH THE DECISION, MAINLY BECAUSE THE SECURITY SITUATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY UNDER CONTROL TO ALLOW THEIR RELEASE AND BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT LACKED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THEM IN COURT. THE DIFFERENCE IN CONTRERAS' ATTITUDE PRIOR TO AND FOLLOWING THE RELEASE IS PROBABLY AN INDICATION OF HOW HE ADJUSTS TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES, SINCE, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] [REDACTED] THE RELEASE WAS WELL RECEIVED IN HIGH ECHELONS OF THE ARMY, WITH THE CONSENSUS BEING THAT IT SHOULD HAVE OCCURRED EARLIER.)

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5. [REDACTED]

7. [REDACTED]

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DENY IN TOTO

PAGES 5 and 6

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(Classification)

[REDACTED] THAT AMUNATEGUI HAD BEEN SENT BY
PINOCHET TO TRY TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT HUGO B A N Z E R
TO AGREE TO A COMMON POSITION REJECTING A PERUVIAN PROPOSAL
FOR BOLIVIA'S CORRIDOR TO THE SEA. IN LATE NOVEMBER, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THAT LEIGH HAD
RELINQUISHED HIS ADVISOR, AMUNATEGUI, TO PINOCHET IN THE
HOPE THAT AMUNATEGUI WILL BECOME THE NEXT MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.)

10. ARMY LEADERS WHO SHARE THE GREATEST DEGREE OF
PINOCHET'S CONFIDENCE ARE GENERALS CORVARRUBIAS; CESAR
B E N A V I D E S, MINISTER OF INTERIOR; AND HERMAN
B R A D Y, MINISTER OF DEFENSE. ([REDACTED] COMMENT: BRADY'S
STAR HAS DECLINED SOMEWHAT RECENTLY.) OTHERS ARE COLONELS
CONTRERAS; CARLOS M E D I N A, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY WAR
ACADEMY; RENE E S C A U R I A Z A, SECRETARY TO THE JUNTA;
AND ENRIQUE V A L D E S, UNDERSECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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11. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]~~SECRET~~

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12. GUZMAN HAS BEEN LOBBYING FOR THE INCLUSION OF CIVILIANS IN THE MILITARY POLITICAL ADVISORY GROUP (ASEP). SPECIFICALLY, HE WOULD LIKE THE FIVE-MAN GROUP TO BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE HIMSELF, ROSENDE, SR., AMUNATEGUI AND SERGIO FERNANDEZ LARRAIN. () COMMENT: THE COMMON DENOMINATOR AMONG THESE CIVILIANS IS THAT THEY ARE ALL FOLLOWERS OF FORMER PRESIDENT JORGE ALESSANDRI.)

() THAT HE WOULD PASS THE SUGGESTION ON TO PRESIDENT PINOCHET, BUT AS YET THERE HAS BEEN NO REPLY.

13. ()

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